








We study three corporate non-market strategies designed to inﬂuence the lobby-
ing behavior of other special interest groups: 1) “astroturf,” in which the ﬁrm
covertly subsidizes a group with similar views to lobby when it normally would
not, 2) the “bearhug,” in which the ﬁrm overtly subsidizes the lobbying activities
of another interest group, and 3) self-regulation, in which the ﬁrm voluntarily
limits the potential social harm from its activities. All three strategies can be
used to reduce the informativeness of lobbying, and all reduce the welfare of the
public decision maker. We show that the decision maker would beneﬁtb yr e q u i r -
ing the public disclosure of funds spent on astroturf lobbying, but the availability
of alternative inﬂuence strategies limits the impact of such a policy.
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The role of interest groups in politics has held a long-standing fascination for political econo-
mists. In the 1780s, James Madison famously warned of the power of “factions” in The
Federalist, while nearly two hundred years later Mancur Olson and George Stigler elevated
the study of interest group politics to an important subﬁeld within economics.1 Pioneering
theoretical work in the Chicago School tradition treated interest group “pressure” as a pro-
duction function, smooth and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.2 In this framework, interest
groups compete to apply more pressure in a game where rival pressure inputs are strate-
gic complements. More recently, theorists have been opening up the black box of political
pressure to focus more explicitly on speciﬁc strategies such as campaign contributions or
lobbying.3
Several recent papers shed new light on the role of lobbying in conveying “soft,” i.e.
unveriﬁable, information to public decisionmakers.4 In these models, interest groups may
be able to credibly transmit soft information if their preferences do not diverge too greatly
from those of the decisionmaker. This recent work, however, typically does not distinguish
ﬁrms from other special interest groups. We argue that in many lobbying situations, ﬁrms
do indeed have preferences distinct from those of other groups. In particular, they often bear
the costs of government policy but do not collect the beneﬁts. This is especially true for
policies dealing with externalities or the provision of public goods. In such circumstances,
ﬁrms cannot credibly convey unveriﬁable information because their powerful bias towards
weak policies is common knowledge among decisionmakers. Thus, existing models really
cannot capture the role of the ﬁrm in lobbying games. Nevertheless, we show that ﬁrms can
play an important role by inﬂuencing the lobbying behavior of other interest groups. The
corporate strategies that accomplish this goal are the subject of our paper.
Most prominent among these strategies is the funding of “astroturf lobbying,” a term
coined by Lloyd Bentsen, long-time Senator from Texas, to describe the artiﬁcial grass-
roots campaigns that are created by public relations (PR) ﬁrms.5 One such ﬁrm is Davies
Communications, whose advertising says “Traditional lobbying is no longer enough. Today
numbers count. To win in the hearing room, you must reach out to create grassroots support.
1Olson (1965) elaborates a rational choice model of interest group action, while Stigler (1971) applies this
approach to the study of regulation speciﬁcally.
2Key early papers include those of Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983).
3Grossman and Helpman (2001) provide an excellent introduction to the more recent theoretical literature
on interest group politics.
4See, for example, Lohmann (1993) and Krishna and Morgan (2001). These models, which build on the
seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), must be distinguished from models of the provision of “hard,”
veriﬁable, information, as analyzed in papers such as Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
5Stauber and Rampton (1995), p. 79.
1To outnumber your opponents, call the leading grassroots public aﬀairs communications
specialists.”6 Davies explains how his ﬁrm generates a “grassroots” letter-writing campaign
through the use of telephone banks:
“We get them on the phone, and while we’re on the phone we say ‘Will you write
a letter?’ ‘Sure.’ ‘Do you have time to write it?’ ‘Not really.’ ‘Could we write
the letter for you? I could put you on the phone right now with someone who
could help you write a letter. Just hold, we have a writer standing by’...If they’re
close by we hand-deliver it. We hand-write it out on ‘little kitty cat stationery’
if it’s a little old lady. If it’s a business we take it over to be photocopied on
someone’s letterhead. [We] use diﬀerent stamps, diﬀerent envelopes. Getting a
pile of personalized letters that have a diﬀe r e n tl o o kt ot h e mi sw h a ty o uw a n t
to strive for.”7
One example of astroturf lobbying is the group People for the West!, which characterizes
itself as “a grassroots campaign supporting western communities.” In 1992, 96% of the
group’s funding came from corporate sponsors such as NERCO Minerals, Cyprus Minerals,
Chevron, and Hecla Mining, who have strong interests in maintaining the General Mining
Act of 1872 that allows them to acquire and mine public lands at a cost of $5 per acre.
The chairman of PFW!, Bob Quick, is the national director of state legislative aﬀairs for
Asarco, a mining company.8 Another example is the Consumer Alliance, a Michigan-based
nonproﬁt that opposes laws to lower the price of prescription drugs to Medicaid participants
and other low-income citizens. A public relations ﬁrm called Bonner & Associates–funded
by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)– uses Consumer
Alliance letterhead to solicit signatures in support of its positions.9
Astroturf lobbying relies on the covert nature of corporate sponsorship in achieving its
eﬀectiveness. On December 19, 1995, President Clinton signed into law the Lobbying Dis-
closure Act of 1995, establishing new registration and reporting requirements for lobbyists
working for corporations, charities and other nonproﬁt organizations engaged in eﬀorts to
inﬂuence legislative and executive branch decisions. The 1995 Act was the ﬁrst major leg-
islation on lobbying in nearly 50 years, and was designed to provide transparency in the
lobbying process. Early drafts of the Lobbying Disclosure Act included provisions requiring
the registration of ﬁrms engaged in astroturf lobbying, and the reporting of the expenditures
made on those actions. Those provisions, however, failed to make it out of committee. As
6Stauber and Rampton (1995), p. 90.
7Stauber and Rampton (1995), pp. 89-91.
8For further details, see Sanchez (1996).
9For more details, see Craig (2002).
2the bill’s sponsor, Senator Carl Levin, testiﬁed before a House committee considering the
bill:
“Every reference to grass roots lobbying – and even to paid eﬀorts to stim-
ulate artiﬁcial grass roots lobbying – has been deleted from the bill...I am per-
sonally disappointed that we were unable to do anything to address the issue
of a form of grass-roots lobbying referred to as “astroturf” lobbying, in which
lobbyists hire professional experts to run phone banks and generate mail in sup-
port of their eﬀorts. In my view, these paid, professional astroturf campaigns
bear nothing in common with the genuine grassroots activities...I ...hope that
the House will reconsider the disclosure of such lobbying...”10
Thus, a signiﬁcant and growing aspect of the lobbying process remains obscured from
public view.
In the present paper we develop a formal model of the lobbying process, focusing on
the role of special interest groups in transmitting information to decisionmakers. We use the
model to study a variety of strategies corporations can use to inﬂuence the lobbying behavior
of other interest groups, all of which share the feature that they reduce the ﬂow of information
to public decisionmakers. Our model provides clear support for public disclosure of corporate
expenditures on astroturf lobbying eﬀorts, as called for by Senator Levin. However, such
disclosure is not a panacea. We also study two other corporate strategies that can impede
the ﬂow of information, even when their use is common knowledge among all participants in
the lobbying process.
We coin the term “bear hug” to refer to a corporate strategy of embracing one’s opposi-
tion by overtly subsidizing its lobbying eﬀorts. This undermines the opposition’s ability to
transmit its information through costly signaling. For example, DeSimone and Popoﬀ point
out that
“It is also important to recognize that there can be a disparity of resources
and information between business stakeholder groups that makes trust diﬃcult
to develop. This may sometimes require action to redress the balance. Since
the Brent Spar incident–when opposition prevented Shell from disposing of a
large oil storage platform at sea–the company has made space available for
environmental groups to explain their point of view in educational and other
m a t e r i a l st h a ti th a sp r e p a r e d . ” 11
10Testimony of Senator Carl Levin, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, U.S.
House of Representatives, September 7, 1995.
11DeSimone and Popoﬀ (2000), p. 165.
3The third strategy we examine, self-regulation, is quite diﬀerent from the other two
strategies, in that it involves real changes in company operations that are designed to reduce
the risks of social harm. If these actions are substantive enough, interest groups may decide
that the further gains from lobbying are not enough to justify the costs, and they may
eschew participation in the political process. Perhaps surprisingly, however, we show that
self-regulation may also beneﬁtt h eﬁrm by inducing interest groups to participate more
actively in the lobbying process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of
the lobbying process. Section 3 studies astroturf lobbying, while section 4 considers the bear
hug. Section 5 addresses the eﬀects of self regulation, and section 6 discusses extensions of
our model to a setting with multiple interest groups. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Lobbying
Our basic model of lobbying is based on Grossman and Helpman (2001), and begins with
two players, a government decisionmaker (DM) and a special interest group (SIG).12 In this
version of the model the ﬁrm has no active role in the lobbying process. We assume the
existence of a proposal that aﬀects the ﬁrm and requires the approval of the decisionmaker,
who may impose a variety of requirements on its passage to ensure that it is socially beneﬁcial.
The proposal might be an application for planning approval of a new manufacturing facility,
in which case the DM may require that the manufacturer install certain emissions control
systems as a condition of operation. In a legislative context, the proposal might call for
amendment of the General Mining Act of 1872, in which case the DM might require the use
of auctions to allocate mining rights on public lands, ensuring that the ﬁscal impact of the
Act is minimized. Alternatively, the proposal might be aimed at health care reform, in which
case the DM might require state Medicaid programs to negotiate the lowest possible prices
from pharmaceutical manufacturers. In each case, the DM’s proposal gives the aﬀected ﬁrms
a powerful incentive to attempt to inﬂuence the policy process.
For ease of presentation we will focus on a decision marker’s choice of stringency of a local
planning permit to build a local manufacturing facility. It is important to note, however,
that the modeling of the decisionmaker as a unitary actor does not limit its applicability
to the planning context. Other authors, such as Lohmann (1993), have used unitary-actor
models to represent a political leader who responds to the preferences of the median voter.
We will discuss our model’s implications for the legislative context as appropriate below.
The construction of a manufacturing plant may have social eﬀects through a variety of
12See Grossman and Helpman (2001), chapter 5.
4mechanisms, e.g. it may create jobs in the local community, it may aﬀect the environmen-
tal quality of the surrounding community, and it may aﬀect the health and safety of that
community. These eﬀects can be summarized by a variable θ ∈ <, which represents the true
state of the world. For simplicity, we will assume that the state of the world captures the
net adverse social impact of the project, and can either be “low” or “high,” so θ ∈ {θL,θ H}.
The DM chooses a policy p that indicates the stringency of the regulatory response to
the project. The DM is assumed to care about his or her constituency, perhaps because of
reelection concerns. The DM’s preferences are represented by G = −(p − θ)2, which implies
that the DM attempts to precisely match the policy to the state of the world. If the project
is likely to have a highly adverse social impact on the local community, then the DM would
favor setting a more stringent regulatory policy. Setting a policy that is higher than the
true state is undesirable for the DM, because, for example, doing so might bring unnecessary
economic hardship to the ﬁr m ,w h i c hm a yi nt u r nn e g a t i v e l ya ﬀe c te m p l o y m e n ti nt h el o c a l
community. Setting too low a stringency is also undesirable for the DM, since community
environmental, health, and safety conditions may be adversely aﬀected. The DM’s prior
belief is that either state of the world is equally likely. Without further information, the











Consequently, under conditions of uncertainty the DM’s optimal decision is to set a moder-
ately stringent policy of p =( θL + θH)/2 with E(G)=−(θH − θL)2/4. We refer to a policy
set at this level as the “average” policy.
The SIG is assumed to know the true state of the world.13 The SIG’s preferences are given
by U = −(p − θ − δ)2 − l,w h e r eδ represents the divergence between the SIG’s preferences
and those of the DM, and l represents the cost to the SIG of lobbying the DM. Given this
speciﬁcation, the SIG always prefers a higher (lower) level of the policy p than does the DM
when δ is positive (negative). We refer to δ as the SIG’s bias. The lobbying cost l may
include not only the direct costs of lobbying, but also the cost of discovering the true state
of the world, i.e., the true social impact of the ﬁrm’s project on the local community. The
general form of the SIG’s utility function captures the assumption that the SIG cares about
both the project’s social and economic eﬀects on the local community. That is to say, even
a positive biased SIG may prefer a less stringent policy to a more stringent policy if the true
state of the world is low enough.
The location of manufacturing plants is often plagued by opposition from local residents
13This may reﬂect technical knowledge, e.g. regarding groundwater ﬂow in regions of karst topography, or
social knowledge, e.g. regarding local community preferences.
5who proclaim that the plant can be built, but “not in my backyard.” While this may be
a purely political phenomenon in some cases, in others it may reﬂect local knowledge of
community preferences over the impacts of the project. In any event, it is natural to assume
δ>0 in this situation, and we use this assumption in laying out the basic structure of the
model. We begin our analysis with the case where l =0 , i.e., the (positive-biased) SIG
knows the true state of the world and can costlessly lobby (report the state to) the DM. We
examine the SIG’s incentives to report the true state of the world when the DM believes the
SIG’s announcement. Since the SIG always prefers a higher level of policy than the DM,
it naturally has no incentive to misreportwhen the state is θ = θH. Misreporting may be
desirable however, if in θ = θL. In this case, the SIG misreports, i.e. reports θH, if its utility
of obtaining θH in the low state exceeds its utility from reporting truthfully, that is, if:
−(θL − θL − δ)
2 < −(θH − θL − δ)
2
Thus, when θ = θL, the SIG misreports if
δ>(θH − θL)/2. (1)
Consider a case where condition (1) holds. This implies that the SIG has a large degree
of bias, or alternatively, that the high and low states are relatively close together. In this
case, the SIG will always report that θ = θH, regardless of the actual state of the world.
Assuming the DM knows δ,θL, and θH, he will recognize the SIG’s incentives, and hence
will not update his prior based on the SIG’s report. Thus, the DM sets p =( θL + θH)/2.
If condition (1) fails to hold, then the SIG will report truthfully, and the DM will use the
SIG’s report to set a policy of θL in the low state, and θH in the high state.14
Turn next to the case where lobbying is costly. Because the SIG is biased toward high
levels of policy, it is particularly concerned about the possibility that the DM sets p = θL
when the state is actually θH. Thus, the SIG is strongly motivated to incur the cost of
lobbying when the state is θH, but may not ﬁnd it worthwhile when θ = θL. Under certain
conditions, which we explain below, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth,
an “equilibrium”) in which the SIG only lobbies when θ = θH. In the equilibrium, the DM
holds the belief that if the SIG lobbies then indeed θ = θH, and if the SIG fails to lobby then
the state is θL. For this equilibrium to exist, the SIG must prefer to refrain from lobbying
when θ = θL, i.e.,−(θL − θL − δ)2 ≥− (θH − θL − δ)2 − l, or15
14Even when (1) fails, the truthful equilibrium is not unique. There always exists an equilibrium in which
the DM distrusts the SIG’s information, and hence always sets the average policy. As a result, any signal by
the SIG constitutes a best response. This equilibrium is not particularly interesting, however, and we will
not consider it in the remainder of the paper.
15Note that with some rearranging of terms, the following expression reduces to (1) when l =0 .
6l ≥ l ≡ (θH − θL)(2δ − (θH − θL)). (2)
At the same time, the SIG must be willing to incur the lobbying cost when the state is
high, i.e. −(θH − θH − δ)2 − l ≥− (θL − θH − δ)2, which can be rewritten as
l ≤ l ≡ (θH − θL)(2δ + θH − θL). (3)
If both (2) and (3) hold, then the equilibrium described above exists; in the remainder of
the paper, we will assume these conditions hold. Thus, a positive lobbying cost aids the SIG
in truthful reporting by allowing it to express the intensity of its preferences. As we shall
see in the subsequent sections, this result gives rise to a number of somewhat unexpected
corporate strategies aimed at undermining the SIG’s ability to express the intensity of its
preferences.
Letting a =( θH − θL), Figure 1 illustrates the values of l and a that give rise to truthful
reporting by the SIG. The top line in the ﬁgure represents the combinations of l and a for
which the SIG is just indiﬀerent between lobbying when the true state of the world is θH
and not lobbying in that state. Above this line, the SIG will choose not to incur the costs
of lobbying even in the high state. The lower line traces out the combinations of l and a for
which the SIG is just indiﬀerent between lobbying in the low state (and falsely announcing
θH) and not lobbying in the low state. For all combinations of l and a below the lower line,
the SIG would strictly prefer to lobby in the low state (and announce θH). (Note that for
a ≥ 2δ, the SIG would report truthfully in both states of the world, even if lobbying were
costless.)
Consider the case of siting a new paper-making facility, which will release some volume
of organochlorines into a river. The facility could use a number of alternative technologies
for bleaching the pulp, which vary in their use of chlorine in the bleaching process and, thus,
in the amount of organochlorines they release into the environment. A local environmental
organization is concerned about organochlorine releases, since they result in the presence
of trace amounts of dioxins–known carcinogens–in the river downstream from the plant.
Suppose condition (1) holds and lobbying is costless. In this case, the environmental group
will always participate in hearings about the plant, and it will argue that dioxins are highly
toxic chemicals whose release should be avoided, regardless of the bleaching technology to be
used and the quantity of releases involved. Since the group will always protest regardless of
the ﬁrm’s technology, its actions convey little about the intensity of its concerns about the
technology. If it is costly for the group to participate in the hearings, however, then the net
beneﬁts of participation are small when dioxins are released in minute amounts, so the group
7will eschew participation in that case. It will allocate its scarce lobbying resources to ﬁghting
the plant only when relatively large amounts of dioxins are likely to be released. Thus, when
lobbying is costly and the local group does show up to participate in the proceedings, this
is credible evidence that the harm from the plant’s dioxin releases is likely to be large,
i.e. the true state is θH. In this case the decisionmaker can learn from the actions of the
environmental group.16
An example in the legislative context would be a decision by lawmakers on whether to
require the state to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies to obtain lower drug prices
for Medicaid recipients. The consumer advocacy group Consumer Alliance might oppose
such negotiations on the grounds that they might result in reduced choice in prescription
drugs for senior citizens. If input from Consumer Alliance is solicited, it might oppose any
proposal regardless of the extent to which it limited choice. If instead Consumer Alliance
had to expend resources to mount a grass-roots campaign against draft legislation, then its
decision to do so on any speciﬁc legislation might serve as a useful signal of the extent to
which the legislation would limit choice.
3A s t r o t u r f
We now introduce the ﬁrm as an active player in the game. Let the ﬁrm’s objective function
be F = −βp2,w h e r eβ>0.T h ep a r a m e t e rβ can be interpreted as an eﬃciency parame-
ter. Firms with large β’s tend to be less eﬃc i e n ta ta d a p t i n gt om o r es t r i n g e n tp o l i c i e s .
The structure of the ﬁrm’s objective function indicates that proﬁts are strictly declining
in the stringency of the DM’s policy, as is typical in economic models of regulation. This
might be the case, for example, for the permitting requirements imposed on a proposed new
manufacturing facility. The vast majority of the ﬁrm’s shareholders do not live in the local
community, and hence are not directly aﬀected by issues such as the availability of jobs
within the community or environmental impacts of the plant. Assuming the DM is aware of
the ﬁrm’s objectives, then it is easy to see that the ﬁrm is not a credible source of information
regarding the state of the world: regardless of the true state, the ﬁrm has incentives to claim
the state is θL.17
In this section, we consider the corporate strategy of “astroturf,” in which the ﬁrm
subsidizes the lobbying cost of a special interest group after the ﬁrm learns the state of the
world. These subsidy payments are made in states in which the special interest group would
normally not lobby. This artiﬁcially-induced lobbying is called “astroturf lobbying.” This
16For further details on the issue of chlorine in the papermaking process, see Beckenstein et al. (1994).
17As a consequence, it is pointless for the ﬁrm to lobby the DM directly. It may, however, exert considerable
inﬂuence over the actions of the other players.
8strategy involves covertly supporting an interest group whose bias is negative; astroturf is
thus a form of costly state falsiﬁcation.18 As we noted in the Introduction, the most common
examples of astroturﬁng involve the hiring of public relations or lobbying ﬁrms to create
artiﬁcial grass-roots campaigns. In some cases these ﬁrms may subsidize the activities of
legitimate grass-roots groups that are sympathetic to their clients’ goals. The subsidies may
be direct monetary payments, but they often involve providing free use of the ﬁrms’ phone
bank equipment and personnel. In the latter case, the employees of the public relations ﬁrm
will pose as members of the grass-roots group when they make phone calls or send faxes.19
The ex post nature of the ﬁrm’s subsidy payment is an important characteristic and dis-
tinguishes the strategy from the “bear hug” strategy, which we will examine in the following
section. In many situations, the ﬁrm will know the true state of the world prior to making its
project proposal. For example, the literature on environmental justice argues that ﬁrms take
community characteristics and impacts into account when deciding where to site industrial
plants.20 In the context of health care reform, pharmaceutical companies presumably know
in advance the true extent to which they will cut R&D spending if Medicaid reforms reduce
the prices paid by the states for prescription drugs.
In our model it is the negative-biased group that is the natural ally of the ﬁrm, since the
SIG’s optimal policy outcome is more lenient than the DM’s optimal policy in all states of
the world.21 Such a group may place a greater value on the economic impacts of the ﬁrm’s
facility than does the decisionmaker. While the DM does not observe the ﬁrm’s subsidy to
the SIG, we will allow the DM to invest in auditing the SIG in order to determine whether
or not the SIG has been subsidized.
We characterize conditions under which astroturf lobbying constitutes an equilibrium in
our model. We begin by considering a single SIG with U = −(p − θ − δ)2 − l,w h e r eδ<0.
Suppose that lobbying is costless (l =0 ), so the SIG can costless deliver a report on the true
state of the world. Since the SIG always prefers a lower level of policy than does the DM,
it has no incentive to misreport when the state is θ = θL. Misreporting may arise, however,
if θ = θH, since the SIG may prefer to obtain a lower policy than θH even in the high state.
The SIG will fail to report truthfully if
−(θH − θH − δ)
2 < −(θL − θH − δ)
2.
18Crocker and Tennyson (1997) study costly state falsiﬁcation in the context of insurance, and show that
the optimal insurance contract typically involves a strictly positive amount of falsiﬁcation.
19For an example, see Craig (2002).
20See Taylor (1992) or Greer and Harding (1993).
21Note that astroturf lobbying will not be used with a positive-biased SIG. Such a SIG chooses not to
lobby in the low state, which leads the DM to set a low level of policy. Subsidizing the SIG to lobby in this
state would induce the DM to set a stringent policy and make the ﬁrm worse oﬀ.
9Thus, when θ = θH, the SIG will send a false report if
δ ≤− (θH − θL)/2. (4)
We can see from condition (4) that the SIG has an incentive to misreport if its bias
is greater than half the distance between the two states. If condition (4) holds, then the
SIG will always report θL and the DM’s optimal response to the SIG’s announcement will
be to set the average policy, since the announcement is not credible. Paralleling our result
in section 2, it is possible for the SIG to lobby credibly, even when condition (4) holds, if
lobbying is costly. In this case, the SIG only lobbies when the state is low, since a policy
mistake in this state is very costly to the SIG; if the state is high, however, the SIG may
ﬁnd it too costly to lobby. As a result, the DM can infer that the state is low when the SIG
lobbies, and high when it does not lobby. For this equilibrium to exist, the SIG must prefer
to refrain from lobbying when θ = θH,i . e . , −(θH − θH − δ)2 ≥− (θL − θH − δ)2 − l, or
l ≥ l ≡ (θH − θL)(−2δ − (θH − θL)). (5)
Note that l> 0 since δ<0.
At the same time, the SIG must be willing to incur the lobbying cost when the state is
low, i.e. −(θL − θL − δ)2 − l ≥− (θH − θL − δ)2, which can be rewritten as
l ≤ l ≡ (θH − θL)(−2δ + θH − θL). (6)
If both (5) and (6) hold, then the equilibrium described above exists.
The question we wish to investigate is: Can the ﬁrm use astroturf lobbying to raise its
expected payoﬀ relative to its payoﬀ when the SIG engages in truthful lobbying behavior?
Recall that for astroturf lobbying to work the ﬁrm’s subsidy to the negatively biased SIG
must occur ex post, and be hidden from the DM. Although we assume that the DM cannot
costlessly observe the ﬁrm’s subsidy payment, it is clear from our discussion in the Introduc-
tion that policy makers are aware of the possibility of the astroturf lobbying strategy. Thus,
we assume the DM can expend some resources in auditing the SIG’s actions in an attempt
to determine whether a subsidy did in fact occur. Let α denote the probability with which
the DM conducts an audit, and τ denote the probability an audit, if conducted, generates
conclusive information about whether a subsidy was conferred; with probability 1 − τ the
DM obtains no information when an audit is conducted. The cost of auditing is c(α),w h e r e
c0(α) > 0 and c00(α) > 0. We will also assume that limα→0 c0(α)=0and limα→1 c0(α)=∞,
which assures an interior solution.
10There are two possible types of equilibria with auditing, one in which astroturf does not
occur and one in which it does.
The “No Astroturf” Equilibrium In this equilibrium, the DM believes (correctly) that
if the SIG lobbies then the state is θL, and if the SIG does not lobby then the state is θH.
To ensure these conditions hold, however, the DM must audit the SIG when it lobbies, in
order to eliminate the ﬁrm’s incentives to astroturf. Assuming the ﬁrm does not engage in
astroturf lobbying, the DM can infer correctly the state of the world, and sets the optimal
policy for each state. Let the DM’s equilibrium audit probability in this case be αNA. Thus,
the DM’s expected payoﬀ is GNA = −c(αNA)/2, since setting the correct policy generates
an optimal utility of zero in both states.
Conditional on the DM’s audit policy, and the DM’s recognition that they are playing
the “No Astroturf” equilibrium, the ﬁrm must prefer not to astroturf in state θH. (It need
not engage in astroturf in state θL, as the SIG lobbies by assumption.) The ﬁrm’s proﬁts if
it does not astroturf are πNA(θH)=−βθ
2










Thus, with probability αNAτ, the DM conducts an audit and the audit reveals that the ﬁrm
engaged in astroturf; the DM then sets a high level of policy. With probability 1 − αNAτ
the DM obtains no new information, either because he does not audit or because the audit
is uninformative; since the DM believes the “No Astroturf” equilibrium is being played, and
has no evidence to the contrary, he sets a low level of policy.













L) − l<0. (7)
In order to enforce the “No Astroturf” equilibrium, the DM must choose αNA to make














Note that as τ becomes smaller, and the audit becomes less likely to be informative, the DM
must audit with a higher probability. In fact, for small enough τ, the constraint that αNA ≤ 1
becomes binding, and it becomes impossible for the DM to satisfy inequality (7). As a result,
the ﬁrm ﬁn d si tp r o ﬁtable to engage in astroturf, and the “No Astroturf” equilibrium does
not exist.
11The “Astroturf” Equilibrium Next we must consider the potential existence of an
alternative equilibrium in which it is common knowledge that the DM does not audit enough
to deter astroturf lobbying. In this equilibrium, the SIG always lobbies regardless of the state
of the world: in the low state the SIG itself is motivated to lobby, while in the high state
the ﬁrm pays the SIG to lobby. As a result, the DM always sets the average policy unless
an audit catches the ﬁrm engaging in astroturf; in this case, the DM knows the state is θH
and sets a stringent policy. We will assume that if the SIG does not lobby–which is an
out-of-equilibrium event–then the DM believes the state must be θH, and sets p = θH.22
Let us consider the SIG’s optimal lobbying strategy in each state of the world. Suppose
the state is θ = θL. The SIG obtains policy p =( θH + θL)/2 if it lobbies and policy p = θH
if it does not. Lobbying is worthwhile if −((θH + θL)/2 − θL − δ)2 − l ≥− (θH − θL − δ)2,
which can be rewritten as
l ≤ l
0
≡ (θH − θL)(3(θH − θL)/4 − δ). (9)
Now suppose the state is θ = θH. Again, the SIG obtains policy p =( θH + θL)/2 if it
lobbies and policy p = θH if it does not. Lobbying is not worthwhile if
−(θH − θH − δ)
2 > −((θH + θL)/2 − θH − δ)
2 − l.











If both (9) and (10) hold, then in equilibrium the SIG’s optimal strategy is to lobby only
in the low state (unless it is subsidized by the ﬁrm to lobby in the high state).23 Figure
2 illustrates the curves l
0
and l0 in relation to the curves l and l derived in section 2. The
mathematical formulation of the curves diﬀers now because in the simple model, if the SIG
lobbies it expects the DM to set the policy it advocates, whereas in the astroturf equilibrium,
lobbying yields only the average policy. As a result, lobbying is less productive for the SIG
and the curves for the astroturf equilibrium are eﬀectively “stretched” to the right, though




the astroturf equilibrium exists if the ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to subsidize the SIG’s lobbying
activity when the state is high.
22This is consistent with the requirement of universal divinity, which requires placing all probability on
the state in which the SIG would beneﬁt most from deviating from equilibrium; in this case, the SIG beneﬁts
more from a deviation in the high state.
23Note that l0> 0 and l
0
> 0 since δ<−(θH − θL)/2.
12We now examine whether it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to engage in astroturf in the high















The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts reﬂect the fact that the stringent policy is imposed only if an
audit reveals that astroturf lobbying occurred; this happens with probability αAτ.Otherwise,
the DM sets the average policy since he believes (correctly) that the “Astroturf” equilibrium
is being played.
If the ﬁrm did not pay for astroturf lobbying when the state was θ = θH, then the SIG
would not lobby. As noted above, this is out-of-equilibrium behavior, given that the DM
believes they are playing the “Astroturf” equilibrium, and we assume that in this event
t h eD Mb e l i e v e st h es t a t ei sθH, and sets p = θH. As a result, the ﬁrm earns π = −βθ
2
H.
To ensure this deviation from equilibrium play does not occur, it must be the case that
πA(θH) > −βθ
2













− l + βθ
2




β(3θH + θL)(θH − θL) >l . (12)
This inequality must be consistent with conditions (9) and (10). The potentially binding
constraint here is (9). Conditions (12) and (9) together require that
1 − αAτ
4
β(3θH + θL)(θH − θL) ≥ (θH − θL)(3(θH − θL)/4 − δ), (13)
which can be rewritten as
β ≥
4(3(θH − θL)/4 − δ)
(1 − αAτ)(3θH + θL)
. (14)
Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For β satisfying inequality (14), the ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁt a b l et of u n dt h eS I Gt o
engage in astroturf lobbying.
Lemma 1 states that if the ﬁrm’s payoﬀfunction is suﬃciently concave, then it is proﬁtable
to engage in the astroturf strategy, i.e., to subsidize the SIG in the high state of the world
even when it faces a positive probability of detection. In doing so, the ﬁrm beneﬁts from
obtaining the average policy in the high state (as long as an audit does not detect the
13subsidy), although it does sacriﬁce the possibility of obtaining p = θL (obtaining the average
policy instead) when the state of the world is low.
Finally, to determine whether an “Astroturf” equilibrium exists, we need to check whether
the DM would prefer to deter astroturf and shift to the “No Astroturf” equilibrium. The





























Given our assumptions about c(α), an interior solution is assured. The DM prefers the








It is evident that the “Astroturf” equilibrium is preferred by the DM if αNA is very high
and/or the audit cost function is highly convex. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 An astroturf equilibrium exists when conditions (4), (9), (10), (14) and (16)
hold.












L). Thus, the size of τ
is critical to determining which equilibrium can be supported. When τ is small, it becomes
diﬃcult for the DM to deter astroturf and αNA becomes large. At the same time, in the
“Astroturf” equilibrium, the marginal value of auditing declines so the DM audits less fre-
quently. This increases the loss due to using a policy that doesn’t match the true state of the
world, though it does decrease the DM’s expenditures on auditing. If c(α) is highly convex,
then the increased costs of deterring astroturf will dominate, and the DM will be more likely
to allow an astroturf equilibrium when τ is small.
In summary, we have demonstrated that a ﬁr mm a yb ea b l et op r o ﬁtably engage in the
practice of astroturﬁng, and that the DM may be unable to prevent this. Taken as a whole
the results of this section lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The public decisionmaker would be better oﬀ if the ﬁrm were required to
publicly disclose its expenditures on astroturf lobbying.
14Proof. Suppose the conditions in Proposition 2 hold. If public disclosure of expenditures
on astroturf lobbying were required, then the DM would always be able to correctly infer
the state, set the optimal policy for each state, and obtain expected payoﬀ G0 =0 .I ft h e
possibility of astroturf lobbying exists, one of two equilibria will result. In the “No Astroturf”
equilibrium the DM’s expected payoﬀ is GNA = −c
¡
αNA¢
/2 <G 0,a n di nt h e“ A s t r o t u r f ”
equilibrium the DM’s expected payoﬀ is GA = −(1 − αAτ)((θH − θL)2/4) − c(αA) <G 0.
Proposition 3 illustrates why decisionmakers may want to pass laws requiring the report-
ing of funding devoted to astroturf lobbying. Interestingly, this desire will exist even when
eﬀorts aimed at detecting astroturf are successful enough to deter the activity, since the DM
must expend real resources on auditing to deter astroturf lobbying, and hence receives a
strictly negative payoﬀ even in the “No Astroturf” equilibrium.
A key feature of astroturf lobbying is its covert nature. Consequently, reporting provisions
contained in early drafts of the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act would have eliminated this
strategy by rendering it ineﬀective. A natural question to ask is whether such provisions
would neutralize altogether corporate manipulation of the information provided provision by
special interest groups. We ﬁnd that this is not the case. In the following two sections we
explore two alternative corporate strategies that also impede the ability of special interest
group to provide information to the decisionmaker. The two strategies involve overt rather
than covert actions on the part of the ﬁrm, and therefore would be unaﬀected by any public
reporting requirements.
4 The “Bear Hug”
In this section we explore the use of publicly observable payments by the ﬁrm that are
aimed at subsidizing the lobbying cost of special interest groups. We show that the ﬁrm may
wish to make these payments to SIGs with either a negative or a positive bias. We focus
on the case of a SIG with a positive bias, since our results are more striking, and perhaps
counterintuitive, for this case. This case sheds light on the seemingly odd situation in which
an interest group such as Greenpeace accepts funding from a large oil company such as
Shell. That is, we assume, as in Section 2, that there exists a positive-biased SIG for which
conditions (1) through (3) hold.24 Then, as we have shown, there exists an equilibrium in
which the SIG’s lobbying activity fully reveals to the DM the true state of the world. In
this section we explore the ﬁrm’s relationship with the SIG under these circumstances. In
particular, we consider a strategy in which the ﬁrm subsidizes the SIG’s lobbying activities,
24All of our results in this section also go through if the SIG is negative-biased.
15and examine when such a strategy might be proﬁtable. This question is addressed in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 If conditions (1) through (3) or (4) through (6) hold, then the ﬁrm has incentives
to subsidize the SIG’s lobbying activity if l ≤ lf ≡ β(θH − θL)2/4.









H)/2. Alternatively, if the DM sets a policy simply based on
its prior, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is F = −β(θH + θL)2/4. Let the diﬀerence between these two




H)/2] = β(θH − θL)2/4 > 0. Thus,
the ﬁrm is willing to spend up to this amount to subsidize the SIG’s lobbying activity.
The intuition behind the lemma is straightforward. The ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is concave with
respect to the stringency of policy. It faces very high costs from a policy of p = θH, and thus
has incentives to take action to avoid this outcome. By committing to subsidize the SIG, the
ﬁrm eﬀectively undermines the SIG’s credibility with the DM (the SIG can no longer show
the intensity of its preferences), and reduces the DM to adopting the policy p =( θL+θH)/2,
i t so p t i m a lc h o i c ew h e nt h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l di su n k n o w n .T h es t r a t e g yi st h u saf o r mo f
“signal jamming,” similar in spirit to the analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) in the
context of predation.25
We use the term “bear hug” to refer to a strategy in which the ﬁrm embraces its opposi-
tion, clasping it so close as to smother it and reduce its eﬀectiveness. The proposition shows
that the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from a policy of “bear hugging,” that is, undertaking actions such
as funding the collection or reporting of information by environmental or local community
organizations.
Note that the ﬁrm’s incentives to engage in a “bear hug” are proportional to β(θH−θL)2.
Hence, the value of this strategy grows as the gap between the high state and the low state
grows. This is quite intuitive, since the bear hug can be seen as a form of insurance against
costly stringent policies. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, less eﬃcient ﬁrms(those with a high
β) have more incentive to adopt this strategy than do more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
Even when the ﬁrm wishes to oﬀer the bear hug, the SIG must be willing to accept the
ﬁrm’s support. This will only be true if the SIG prefers to costlessly obtain the average
policy outcome rather than incur the lobbying cost l in the high state to credibly deliver the
25Note that the lobbying activities of a negatively bias e dS I Gc a na l s oi n f o r mt h eD Mo ft h et r u es t a t e ;i n
this case, the SIG only lobbies when the state is low. Since the ﬁrm prefers that the DM not know the state
of the world, signal jamming through the use of the bearhug can be valuable for a negatively biased SIG as
well as one with a positive bias.
16report θH. Mathematically, the SIG must prefer
.5[−((θH + θL)/2 − θH − δ)




2 − l/2. (18)
Expanding (17) and comparing it to (18) we see that the SIG is willing to accept the subsidy
l if
l ≥ l
BH ≡ (θH − θL)
2 /2. (19)
Comparing the condition (19) to the ﬁrm’s subsidy condition l ≤ β (θH − θL)
2 /4,w ea r el e d
immediately to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume conditions (1) through (3) or (4) through (6)hold. Then for β>2
there exists a non-empty set of values l ∈ [(θH − θL)
2 /2,β(θH − θL)
2 /4] for which the bear
hug is proﬁtable to the ﬁrm and will be accepted by the SIG in equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates the existence of various bear hug equilibria. The curve lBH provides
the locus of lobbying costs l for which the SIG is willing to accept the bear hug over the
relevant range of a ≡ (θH − θL), i.e. a<2|δ|.T h ec u r v elf illustrates, over the same range,
the maximum subsidy the ﬁrm is willing to pay. Since lfexceeds lBH, there exist (a,l) pairs
such that the SIG will be willing to accept the ﬁrm’s bear hug. Note, however, that the ﬁrm
will only engage in the bear hug for those values of a for which lBH >l . If this condition is
violated the bear hug is not necessary, as the SIG’s report lacks credibility.
As with the ﬁrm, we have examined the SIG’s willingness to accept the ﬁrm’s subsidy
from an ex ante perspective. If the SIG knew that the true state of the world was high, the
SIG would reject the ﬁrm’s subsidy. Consequently, acceptance of the subsidy would reveal
that the true state of the world was θL and the bear hug strategy would fail.26
The eﬀects of the bear hug on the DM’s expected utility are shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 The bear hug strategy reduces the public decisionmaker’s expected payoﬀ
relative to the full information case.
26In the text we have considered only the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Mixed strategy equilibria
in which the ﬁrm randomizes its subsidy oﬀers are also possible, and may be more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. A
proof is available from the authors upon request. Note that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, the DM does
not observe directly whether the subsidy took place; rather, it simply believes (perhaps based on the ﬁrm’s
past behavior) that the ﬁrm is engaging in mixing behavior.
17Proof. Without the subsidy, the DM’s expected utility is E(G)=0 . T h eS I Gc a nb er e l i e d
upon to reveal the true state, and the DM can thus tailor policy perfectly to each state
of the world. When the ﬁrm subsidizes the SIG, the DM’s expected utility is E(GBH)=
(1/2)[−((θL +θH)/2−θL)]2 +(1/2)[−((θL +θH)/2−θH)]2 = −(θH −θL)2/4 < 0. Hence the
DM is worse oﬀ when the ﬁrm supports the SIG.
The proposition shows that under conditions (1) through (3) or (4) through (6), the
DM is strictly worse oﬀ when the ﬁrm provides ﬁnancial support to the SIG. While signal-
jamming is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm, and may be accepted by the SIG as a way to economize
on lobbying costs, it is unwelcome to the decisionmaker because it prevents the optimal
matching of policy to circumstances.
There are two potential issues in assessing when the “bear hug” is a viable strategy.
First, the strategy must apply to situations where the true state of the world is unknown to
all players at the time the subsidy is granted. The reason for this restriction is as follows.
If the ﬁrm knew the true state of the world was θL, it would prefer that the conditions of
truthful revelation held. These conditions would require that no subsidy be given, so the
SIG eschews lobbying. If the ﬁrm knew the state was θH, however, it would want to publicly
make a subsidy payment to the SIG so as to undermine its credibility before the DM. Thus,
if the ﬁrm knew the true state, then its subsidy would be state dependent, and the DM
could determine the true state simply by observing whether the subsidy payment had been
made. In consequence, the bear hug strategy is more likely to apply to situations with true
scientiﬁc uncertainty or situations with a risk of accidents than to situations where the ﬁrm
knows the state in advance. The bear hug can thus be seen as a kind of insurance policy
against worst-case policy outcomes.
T h es e c o n di s s u ea ﬀecting the viability of the bear hug is that the ﬁrm must be able
to ensure that its subsidy is used to subsidize the SIG’s lobbying costs on the particular
issue of concern. Thus, there may be diﬃculties implementing the bear hug strategy if the
SIG operates in multiple policy arenas. Returning to our example, a general purpose gift
to an environmental group may simply go to subsidize the group’s ﬁxed costs, but may not
guarantee that extra funds are devoted to lobbying about dioxin. Thus, the ﬁrm may need
to tie the gift to SIG activity in a particular issue area. This might be done by providing
the SIG with a forum in which it can express its views. For example, in the paper industry
example, the environmental group could be invited to participate in a paper industry forum,
at the industry’s expense, thereby targeting the support toward a particular issue.
185S e l f - R e g u l a t i o n
In section 3 we illustrated that the ex post strategy of astroturf is only possible with a SIG
that has a negative bias. In section 4 we analyzed the bearhug, which can be used with
either type of SIG. This strategy, however, is dependent on the cooperation of the SIG in
that it must accept the ﬁrm’s payment ex ante, and credibly commit to use the payment
to subsidize its lobbying costs on the issue at hand. In this section, we study an ex ante
corporate strategy that does not require any cooperative actions by the SIG. Speciﬁcally
we study the possibility that the ﬁrm may be able to alter the SIG’s lobbying behavior by
reducing the severity of the high state, i.e. to reduce θH, through voluntary improvements
made ex ante. This might be done, for example, through design measures for a new facility
that reduce the impact of worst-case outcomes. As long as the DM has the power to hold
the ﬁrm to the design it proposes, such actions constitute credible commitments.
The basic intuition here is that if the diﬀerence between the high and low states is
suﬃciently small, then the SIG will have little motivation to lobby the DM. Hence, self-
regulation by the ﬁrm may induce the SIG to eschew lobbying, with the result that the
DM sets the average policy. However, there may also be a counterintuitive reason for self-
regulation: as we show below, the ﬁrm may also obtain the average policy because self-
regulation induces the SIG to lobby in both states. In either case, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts rise
by ∆ = β(θH − θL)2/4, a ss h o w ni nL e m m a2 . B a r o n( 2 0 0 1 )r e f e r st os u c hp r o ﬁt-driven
self-regulation as “strategic corporate social responsibility,” in contrast to corporate social
responsibility that is altruistically motivated.
Recall the notation a = θH −θL, and denote by a0 the initial gap between the states. We
consider self-regulation as a voluntary reduction in a on the part of the ﬁrm, cutting it from
a0 to a1.T h a ti s ,t h eﬁrm’s voluntary action reduces the severity of the DM’s optimal policy
in the high state of the world. Thus, if the ﬁrm reduces θH from θL +a0 to θL +a1,a n dt h i s
induces the SIG to eschew lobbying or to lobby in both states, then the DM sets the average




1/4).27 If the ﬁrm took no action, and the SIG revealed the true state through its lobbying








0/2).The net beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm is ∆SR(a1)=FSR−F0 = β(a0−a1)θL+β(2a2
0−a2
1)/4 > 0.
Recall that the payoﬀ function for the ﬁrm is F = −βp2. How should we represent the cost
of achieving a?I ft h eﬁrm were forced to comply with a policy of p = θH, the cost diﬀerence
between a0 and a1 would be k(a1)=−β(θL+a1)2−(−β(θL+a0)2)=β(2θL+a0+a1)(a0−a1).
27We could allow the ﬁrm to reduce both θH and θL, and as long as the former is reduced more than the
latter, all our results in this section would still go through.
19In order to be consistent with this payoﬀ function, we will assume that the cost to the ﬁrm
of achieving such a reduction is k(a1)=β(2θL + a0 + a1)(a0 − a1). Thus we allow the ﬁrm
no extra beneﬁt from engaging in unmandated reductions in θH.28
Combining the beneﬁts and the cost of voluntary action (assuming the action is suﬃcient












0 − βθL(a0 − a1).
Recalling that a1 <a 0, it is easy to see that V (a1) is positive for a1 suﬃciently close to a0.
Since ∂V/∂a1 > 0, the ﬁrm prefers the largest a1 ( s m a l l e s ta m o u n to fs e l f - r e g u l a t i o n )t h a ti s
suﬃcient to render the SIG’s lobbying choice uninformative.29 Let a1 be smallest value of a1
that the ﬁrm is willing to choose; this can be found by setting V (a1)=0 . Thus, the ﬁrm is
willing to self-regulate to any value of a between a1 and a0 if this will undermine the SIG’s
lobbying eﬀorts.30
How will a voluntary action aﬀect the decisions of the SIG? Recall that conditions (2) and
(3) deﬁne when the SIG will ﬁnd it worthwhile to lobby before the DM. If l ≤ l = a(2δ +a)
then the SIG ﬁnds it worthwhile to lobby when the state is θH, while if l ≥l= a(2δ−a) then
the SIG does not lobby when the state is θL. Clearly self-regulation shifts l and l,a n di n
the process may cause the SIG to change its lobbying behavior. This is perhaps most easily
seen by reference to Figure 1, in which l and l divide the (a,l) space into three regions: 1)
The region with l>l, in which the SIG never lobbies, 2) the region with l< l , in which
the SIG always lobbies, and 3) the region with l>l>l , in which the SIG lobbies only if
θ = θH. Of course, only in the third region is lobbying activity actually informative to the
DM. Figure 4 builds on Figure 1 but adds two shaded regions. In each of these regions,
the initial point (a0,l) is within the region where the SIG’s lobbying eﬀorts are informative,
but the ﬁrm is willing to self-regulate to an extent that will result in a westward move that
causes the SIG to change behavior. In the shaded region close to l, self-regulation causes the
SIG to abandon lobbying. In the shaded region close to l, self-regulation has the opposite
eﬀect: it induces the SIG to lobby in both states of the world. In either case, however, the
SIG’s lobbying choice becomes uninformative for the DM, which is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm.
28It is not uncommon in the literature on voluntary environmental agreements for authors to assume
that voluntary actions are less costly than mandated actions. The authors of these papers argue that
voluntary actions allow ﬁrms greater ﬂexibility in meeting environmental goals. We refrain from modeling
this exogenous bias, which serves only to make voluntary actions more desirable. For a discussion of papers
that adopt this exogenous cost bias in favor of voluntary actions see Lyon and Maxwell (2002b).
29Recall that the SIG’s lobbying can be made uninformative either by inducing the SIG to never lobby, or
to lobby in both states of the world.
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, and is thus a function of a0. However, in what
follows we suppress this dependence for notational simplicity.
20We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 There exist two ways in which corporate self-regulation can proﬁtably alter
interest group lobbying behavior: a) if a0(2|δ| + a0) >l>a 0(2|δ| − a0) and l>(a0 −
a1)(2|δ|+a0 −a1), then self-regulation induces the interest group to eschew lobbying, and b)
if a0(2|δ|−a0) <l<(a0 −a1)(2|δ|−a0 +a1), then self-regulation induces the interest group
to become a pure advocate that lobbies regardless of the actual state of the world. In either
case, the interest group’s lobbying behavior becomes uninformative and proﬁts rise.
Proof. Begin with case (a). We require two conditions. First, a0(2|δ|+a0) >l>a 0(2|δ|−a0)
ensures that the initial pair (a0,l) is such that the SIG’s lobbying behavior is informative;
that is, it ensures that l ∈ (l,l). Second, l>(a0 − a1)(2|δ| + a0 − a1) ensures that after
self-regulation, the SIG is in the region in which lobbying is never worthwhile; that is,
after self-regulation, we have l>l. Now turn to case (b). The condition a0(2|δ| − a0) <l
ensures that the SIG does not always lobby at the initial pair (a0,l). The second condition
l<(a0 − a1)(2δ − a0 + a1) ensures that after self-regulation, we have l< l , and the SIG
engages in (uninformative) lobbying regardless of the state of the world.
The eﬀect of self-regulation on interest group behavior in this model is more complex
than in some previous models. For example, Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) show that
self-regulation can deter entry into the political arena by a consumer interest group. Self-
regulation reduces the marginal beneﬁts of political entry, and thus can eﬀectively deter it.
I nt h ep r e s e n tm o d e l ,t h i se ﬀect corresponds to case (a) of the above proposition. However,
the present model also admits case (b), in which self-regulation induces greater lobbying
activity on the part of the interest group. Why does this occur? Recall that the SIG has
a positive bias, meaning it prefers a policy p that is strictly greater than the true state.
Furthermore, we have focused on the case where the SIG’s bias is great enough (δ>a / 2)
that the SIG has an incentive to report falsely when θ = θL. If it can thereby induce the
DM to set a policy of p = θH, it obtains payoﬀ −(a − δ)2 − l rather than the payoﬀ of −δ
2
it would receive for truthful reporting that yields a policy of p = θL.T h u s ,t h ep a y o ﬀ from
misreporting rises as a approaches δ from above. Self-regulation thus makes false reporting
more advantageous for the SIG, and leads the SIG to lobby more often.
It is also interesting to ask how the decisionmaker is aﬀected by self regulation that
renders lobbying uninformative. This is the subject of the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Self-regulation reduces the public decisionmaker’s expected payoﬀ relative to
the case of full information.
21Proof. Without self regulation, the DM’s expected payoﬀ is simply G0 =0 , since policy
can be tailored precisely to the state of the world ex post. With self regulation, the DM
lacks information about the state and must set the average policy. Suppose that the ﬁrm’s
self-regulatory actions are observed by the DM. Then the DM sets p = θL + a1/2,w h i c hi s
equal to the expected value of the state. Now the DM’s expected payoﬀ becomes
E(G
SR)=−.5(θL + a1/2 − θL)




Clearly E(GSR) <G 0,a n dt h eD Mi sw o r s eo ﬀ as a result of the ﬁrm’s self-regulatory
action.
In this model, the DM is best able to maximize his objective function when he has full
information about the state of the world. Then he can tailor policy to the speciﬁcs of the
situation before him. Self-regulation is only undertaken by the ﬁrm if it will render the SIG’s
lobbying uninformative. This deprives the DM of the information he desires, and as a result
the DM is worse oﬀ. This result contrasts with that in earlier work, such as that of Lyon
and Maxwell (2002a), who show that the regulator beneﬁts when industry self-regulation
preempts the imposition of new regulations. The key diﬀerence is that Lyon and Maxwell
(2002a) study a model in which self-regulation does not aﬀect the information ﬂow to the
regulator.
It is worth noting that if the ﬁrm undertakes a strategy that renders lobbying uninfor-
mative, then the DM obtains higher utility from self-regulation than from the bear hug.31
Nevertheless, although self-regulation reduces the severity of the high state, it never entirely
compensates for the loss of information caused by the decision to self-regulate.
6 Multiple Interest Groups
To this point, we have concentrated on cases involving only a single interest group. In this
section, we discuss how our results may be extended to cases with multiple interest groups.
We follow the typology used by Grossman and Helpman (2001) to classify the structure of
multiple SIG situations: 1) “Like bias” arises when all groups share the same direction of
bias, but with diﬀerent intensity; 2) “Opposite bias” arises when diﬀerent groups are biased
in opposite directions, and 3) “Unknown bias” arises when the groups receive imperfect
signals regarding the state of the world. The ﬁrst two cases, in contrast to the third, assume
31We do not formally compare the DM’s expected payoﬀ in the astroturf equilibrium with that obtained
under the bearhug or self-regulation. This is because the astroturf strategy is only applicable when the ﬁrm
already knows the state of the world, while the other two strategies are only applicable when the ﬁrm does
not know the state.
22that both SIGs have perfect information regarding the state of the world at the time they
lobby the DM. We consider these in turn, focusing on the case of two SIGs for simplicity.
6.1 Like Bias
We will label the two SIGs “radical” and “moderate,” with the former possessing a larger
value of δ. We assume the moderate group, as in earlier sections, has a bias that satisﬁes
conditions (1) through (3). The more radical group may meet these conditions, but could
also be so biased that it always lobbies and always claims that the state is high. This
latter possibility may arise even if lobbying is costly, if the radical group’s bias (δ)i sh i g h
enough. If the ﬁrm prefers a policy set at the average level, then it prefers to mute (render
uninformative the group’s lobbying actions) the moderate group, since the radical group
lacks credibility anyway. This can be accomplished by bear hugging the moderate group ex
ante, if that group’s bias is great enough that it will always claim the state is high when
lobbying is costless. (Alternatively, similar results can be achieved through astroturﬁng ex
post, if the group has a negative bias.) Thus, this case diﬀers little from the single SIG case
analyzed above.
Alternatively, if the radical SIG’s bias is not too great, then the DM could also rely on
it to provide reliable information through costly lobbying. In this case, bear hugging (or
astroturﬁng) the moderate SIG will not be suﬃcient to aﬀect the DM’s decision. Instead,
the ﬁrm must subsidize both SIGs. Again, however, this case diﬀers only trivially from the
case of a single SIG.32
Overall, we conclude that the addition of a second SIG with like bias to that of the ﬁrst
SIG is unlikely to generate much additional insight. However, it is worth noting that if
all groups must be subsidized, then the cost of any kind of subsidy strategy rises linearly
with the number of SIGs. This is not true of the self-regulation strategy, however. A single
voluntary improvement aﬀects all SIGs at once. If the ﬁrm undertakes enough voluntary
action to preempt the involvement of the most extreme group, then all other groups will be
preempted as well. Thus, we hypothesize that self-regulation is likely to outperform subsidy
strategies as the number of SIGs grows.33
32Equilibria in all models with incomplete information depend critically on the beliefs held by the players.
In our model, the actions of the ﬁrm depend on how the DM chooses to interpret the lobbying actions of
the SIGs. For example, suppose the DM held the belief that the state is high if both SIGs lobby and is low
if neither ﬁrm lobbies, and he views any other outcome as uninformative. Then the ﬁrm would achieve the
a v e r a g ep o l i c yb ym u t i n go n l yo n eS I G .
33This is particularly likely to be the case if the bias of the most radical group does not change as the
number of groups grows. Otherwise, if the bias of the most radical group grows along with the number of
groups, then the cost of self-regulation will grow as well, and the cost comparison becomes more diﬃcult.
236.2 Opposite Bias
When the two SIGs are biased in opposite directions, matters become more interesting. At
least two types of equilibria are possible: 1) the DM ignores one SIG and simply relies on
the other, and 2) Each SIG lobbies in one state of the world, and the DM relies on both. In
particular, an equilibrium of the second type may exist in which the SIG with positive bias
lobbies in the high state, while the SIG with negative bias lobbies in the low state.34
Recall from our earlier analysis that the bear hug can be applied to groups with either
type of bias, but requires commitment ability and must be undertaken before the ﬁrm learns
the state of the world. Astroturf does not require commitment ability, and can be undertaken
ex post, but it can only be employed with groups having a negative bias. Self-regulation is
undertaken ex ante, and will inﬂuence both types at once.
Case 1 is similar to the case of like bias. If the ﬁrm successfully bear hugs the “active” SIG,
then the inactive SIG may ﬁnd it worthwhile to lobby, and the DM will ﬁnd it worthwhile
to pay attention to it. Thus, the ﬁrm needs to bear hug both of the SIGs. Alternatively, the
ﬁrm may use self-regulation to inﬂuence both SIGs at once.
Case 2 is somewhat more complex. On the one hand, if the lobbying activities of one
group are rendered ineﬀective, then the initial equilibrium is destroyed. However, there is
an alternative equilibrium (Case 1) in which the DM pays attention to only one of the SIGs,
and this becomes the only equilibrium if one SIG is bear hugged. Hence, the ﬁrm must
again undermine the credibility of both groups, either through bear hugs or self-regulation,
if it wishes to be successful. On the other hand, if the ﬁr mk n o w st h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l d ,
it might choose to engage in astroturf lobbying when the state is high, thereby inducing
the negatively biased SIG to lobby at the same time that the positively biased SIG lobbies.
The eﬀectiveness of this strategy will depend on the DM’s beliefs in this out-of-equilibrium
event. If, as seems reasonable, the DM sets the average policy when both SIGs lobby, then
astroturf may be proﬁtable in exactly the same way as in section 3 above.
T h eg e n e r a lp o i n ti st h a tt h eb a s i cs t r u c t u re of our analysis appears to remain valid in
the presence of multiple SIGs, as long as those SIGs all possess full information regarding
the state of the world. The main change from adding multiple groups is that self-regulation
may become relatively more attractive as the number of SIGs rises.
6.3 Unknown Bias
As before, one group is assumed to be radical, and willing to lobby in both states of the
world. However, the DM is assumed to be unable to distinguish one group from the other,
34See Grossman and Helpman (2001), chapter 5, for details.
24hence can only make use of information regarding the number of ﬁrms that lobby. Lohmann
(1993) analyzes this setting in the context of N>2 groups, but Grossman and Helpman
(2001) show that her main insights can be derived in a model with just two groups. Consider
the case of two groups with like biases. Lohmann emphasizes the case in which the more
radical SIG always lobbies, regardless of the state. The DM does not know which group
is the more biased, but can still use the extent of lobbying as a noisy signal regarding the
state of the world. For example, the DM may conclude that the state is high if two SIGs
lobby, and low if only one does.35 If the ﬁrm can identify the more moderate SIG, then it
can subsidize the moderate group, just as in the case of known bias. If this is not possible,
then the ﬁrm must subsidize both groups.
Now consider the case of opposite bias. Suppose that the SIG with positive bias is the
more radical one, and it plays the role of a pure advocate, that is, it always lobbies and
claims the state is high. The more moderate SIG only lobbies when the state is low. Thus,
the appearance of 1 SIG indicates that the state is high, while the appearance of 2 groups
indicates the state is low, and the DM sets a low level of policy when both groups lobby, but
a high level when only one group lobbies. Once again, if the ﬁrm subsidizes the moderate
group, then that group will always lobby, and the DM must set policy without gaining any
information from the SIGs. If the ﬁrm cannot determine which group is which, then it must
subsidize both.
The case of unknown biases is more subtle than the ﬁrst two cases we discussed, since
the SIGs don’t know the state of the world for certain. Sometimes they will be wrong, and
the DM must take this into account. Nevertheless, for our purposes, most of the qualitative
features of the models seem basically the same.
One new possibility may emerge in the case of N>2 SIGs with imperfect information. If
the groups move sequentially in presenting their information, the possibility of information
cascades arises, as in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). In such a setting, there
is a large premium to being the ﬁr s tS I Gt ol o b b y ,s i n c ea l lt h es u b s e q u e n tS I G sm a yb e
inﬂuenced by the actions of the ﬁrst. There is also a large premium to the ﬁrm if it can
inﬂuence the information revealed by the ﬁrst SIG to lobby. This case, while interesting, is
beyond the scope of the present paper.
35A failure to lobby by both ﬁr m si so ﬀ-equilibrium path behavior. Grossman and Helpman (2001, p. 154)
identify beliefs for the DM under which it infers the state is low when neither ﬁrm lobbies.
257C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have developed a model to explore how ﬁrms may inﬂuence the lobbying
behavior of special interest groups. We built on the framework presented by Grossman and
Helpman (2001), in which costly lobbying may convey unveriﬁable information to a public
decisionmaker. The basic idea of this framework is that when lobbying is costly, an interest
group’s decision to lobby provides credible information about the strength of its preferences
regarding a particular policy issue. We have shown that ﬁrms may have both the incentive
and the ability to undermine this information transmission process, reducing the public
decisionmaker’s payoﬀ in the process.
We considered three corporate non-market strategies: 1) “astroturf ” in which the ﬁrm
subsidizes the lobbying activities of a group with similar views, 2) the “bear hug,” in which
the ﬁrm subsidizes the lobbying activities of an interest group, and 3) self-regulation, in which
the ﬁrm voluntarily limits the potential social harms from its activities. All three of these
strategies can be used to reduce the informativeness of lobbying, which can be proﬁtable for
the ﬁrm if the costs of complying with public policy are suﬃciently convex. When compliance
costs are convex, the ﬁrm gains if the public decisionmaker sets policy based on expected or
average social harm, rather than face the risk that policy will be tailored to actual harm.
In many situations, the ﬁrm is likely to know the true state of the world already, especially
if that state depends on characteristics of the ﬁrm’s technology or management processes. For
example, the state of the world might be the level of health risk associated with the operation
of a particular plant, which depends upon corporate decisions regarding technology and
management. In such settings, astroturf lobbying can be induced by the ﬁrm, which covertly
subsidizes the lobbying activity of an interest group with similar preferences in states of the
world where the interest group would not otherwise lobby. For example, the group might
represent local business organizations that stand to beneﬁti ft h eﬁrm builds a new plant in
the area. We model this strategy as a form of costly state falsiﬁcation. We show that the
decisionmaker has incentives to audit the relationship between the ﬁrm and the interest group
for evidence of astroturf lobbying, and identify conditions under which astroturf lobbying
nevertheless takes place in equilibrium. Our model shows that a law requiring the reporting
of astroturf lobbying expenditures would render the strategy ineﬀective, and that this would
be desirable for the public decisionmaker.
Requiring the reporting of astroturf lobbying expenditures is worthwhile, but is not a
panacea. We examine two alternative corporate strategies that can also reduce the infor-
mativeness of lobbying, even when their use is common knowledge to all players. These
strategies diﬀer from astroturf lobbying in that they can only be used by the ﬁrm before it
26l e a r n st h et r u es t a t eo ft h ew o r l d .T h i si sp a r t i c u l a r l yl i k e l yi ns i t u a t i o n so ft r u es c i e n t i ﬁc
uncertainty, such as currently exists regarding the future impacts of global warming. These
alternative strategies can prevent special interest groups from informing the decisionmaker
about the true state after they learn its value.
The “bear hug” serves as a signal-jamming device that prevents the interest group from
signalling the intensity of its views. One might expect that the group would be unwilling to
accept a subsidy that reduces the credibility of its statements. Nevertheless, we show that
if lobbying is costly enough, then it is optimal for the group to accept the ﬁrm’s embrace.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h i ss t r a t e g ym a yn o tb ed y n a m i c a l l yc o n s i s t e n tf o rt h eﬁrm:
even though it raises expected proﬁts ex ante, it is unproﬁtable ex post in some states of the
world. Hence, the strategy is only feasible if the ﬁrm can credibly commit to subsidize the
interest group regardless of the true state.
The third strategy we study is self-regulation, namely, voluntary actions to reduce the
social harm that occurs in adverse states of the world. Such voluntary actions can change
the lobbying incentives of interest groups, and may render them uninformative, which is
proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. Self-regulation has subtle eﬀects in our model. The most intuitive
eﬀect is that self-regulation can preempt interest group lobbying, by reducing the beneﬁt
from lobbying relative to its cost. Another, less intuitive, possibility is that self-regulation
can strengthen the incentives of a positive-biased interest group to falsely report that the
state is high when it is really low. An interest group with positive bias wants a policy greater
than that justiﬁe db yt h et r u e( l o w )s t a t eo ft h ew o r l d ,b u ti tm a yn o tw a n tt h ep o l i c yt o
be fully as stringent as would be justiﬁed in the high state of the world. By bringing the
high state closer to the low state, self-regulation makes it less costly for the interest group to
endure the stringent policy, and makes it more attractive for the group to engage in lobbying
in both states of the world.
Our analysis focuses on the case of a single interest group, but appears to be robust to the
incorporation of multiple groups. The most interesting possibility that arises with multiple
groups is that self-regulation becomes relatively more attractive, since a single investment in
self-regulation can mute all groups at once, while the cost of a strategy based on subsidies
rises linearly with the number of groups.
Under all three of the strategies we consider, the public decisionmaker is made worse oﬀ.
The key reason is that when the decisionmaker is fully informed, he can tailor policy precisely
ex post to the particular state of the world. All three of the strategies we study here are
designed to stem the ﬂow of information, and while this increases proﬁts it simultaneously
reduces the decisionmaker’s expected payoﬀ.
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